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(0)
Introduction.
Of all peoples on the face af the earthAmericans are the
most sensitive as to anything that relates to their MLiberty
Any restraint upon their freedom iramediately engages their
closest attentionand any possible infringment upon their
rights is at once investigated. For this reason has the sub-
jeot of legislation interfering with the Freedom of Contract
called forth much discussion and argument of a most inter-
esting nature. But the question is stilla mooted one -at
least it is generally deemed unsettled;and the recent legis-
lation in relation to the subject has caused many of our
most conservative men to lament the present tendency of our
governmentand as many of our more socialistic body to
rejoice at the same tendency ;and has incited them to
demand still further legislation of the same nature. What
the indifferent majority will believewhen they awake enough
to appreciate the situation and take an active part in
deciding the matter,is at present an uncertainty,and indeter-
minable ; but judging from the remote as well as the not
far distant past,it would seem that public opinion will
be in favor of the existig policy.

(I)
PUBLIC POLICY -THE INITIATORY FORCE.
It has been most truly said by our greatest economists and
sociologists whose chief aim is to teach us true principles
of governmentthat the historical method of dealing with
any subject is the most profitable and the one most liable
to teach us correct views . So in a superficial way I shall
touch upon the history of the doctrine of freedom of contract
at various points through-out this paper.
To go back then for centurdtes,leaving aside all the
conditions of modern life-annihilating in our minds all the
influences of civilization,picturing man as controlled by the
same influences that now control the monkeys in the wilds
of Central Africa-we find man uncivilized and left to act
according to his own will,except as the physical superiority
of a companion held sway ever him. Then we certainly find
a condition as near to freedom of contract as possible. Yet
even then duress was a thumb-screw that bore down upon his
will and interlfered with his freedom
But it is unnecessary to go back this far,to firid the
theory of freedom of contract in such active operation
that a man could contract away his whole freedom.
(2)
There has been a time in the history of almost every nation
when a man had the perfect right to Pargain himself into
slavery if he chose . Now that we find such rights of
contract entirely gone it is altogether fitting that
we ask in what way were these rights withdrawn. Was it
alone because people no longer wished to sell themselves,
and refrained from exercising their own foolish tendencies ,
or was it because of legislation or what took the place of
laws then-custem,which was the unexpresseri but well impressed
will of the people. Findingso many instances where
punishment has been meted out for making these contractual
relations,I think that we are forced to believe that they
were not eliminated by universal consent but were suppressed
by the stigma of public opinion. Such bargains were so
clearly against public policy that they were done away with
long before slavery as an institution was abolished.
Public policy therefore ,which has been defined as the
prevailing opinion as to what is for the public good," was
the initiatery force which restricted the right to absolute
freedom of contract.
(3)
PUBLIC POLICY STILL MAKES THE LIMIT.
To the student of histery,a casual glance at the great
changes will suffice to convince him that the element of
public policy in the law of contracts,and in law generally,
is by no means of recent origin,but ewes its existence to
the very sources of law . The abolition of free will
slavery mentioned in the preceding chapter is a striking
example of the earliest time. How strong this force was
among the Israelites is shown by the public indignation that
followed the bargain of Esau with his brother-selling his
birth-right for a mass of potage.
But it was not until the rise of the more civilized
nations of Greece and Rome that public policy became direct
and effective as an influence in the regulation of contracts
In Greece it was strong enough for many decades to centrol
the business and commercial interests,and confine them to
the limits of Greece herself ;no trading with foreign nations
being allowed beyond that which was absolutel$ necessary.
And the same was true of that great law-making nation
the Roman Empire. For many years there was the same policy as
to commerce and contractual relations with people of
(4)
foreign nation until Rome took on a more cosmopolitan
form and became engrossed with the desire for political
power,and the policy then came so as to encourage commerce.
And at the same time in many other ways,laws regulated
the freedom of contract as it did their polical rights,
and we find that for the most part they were net the dic-
tates of a tyrannical ruler,but laws having in mind the
welfare of the people,such as the people thought were
expedient.
Then came the feudal system,not of itself an institu-
tion founded on public policy,but never-the-less teeming
with its relations of status which restricted the freedom
of contractso that in time public policy,which had
gradually changedarose through a long struggle and for
once in its history enlarged the powers of contract.
The feudal system had culminated in the growth of towns-
of the village communitiesthe more modern patriarchal
families and tribes where the people were bound together
by the closest ties of friendship and kinship.
Here it was perfectly natural that such commanities
should long retain the. stamp of the original family relation-
that the relative positions of the different members should
(5)
should be the positions into which they had been born-that
their mutual rights should be determined by the status or
condition in life into which they were born rather than by
contracts voluntarily entered into between free and inde-
pendent men,and that custom rather than competition should
fix the serviced mutually due,and the compensation therfor
as well as the basis of exchange of products. In such
societies the ancient sense of loyalty and of duties take
the place of independenberand rights. Within such communi-
tiescompetitive bargaining is comparitively unknown. Status
instead of contract,custom instead of competition,loyaltv
instead of independence indicate the leading contrasts
"I
between medieval and modern life".
"In the former a man was held entitled to a fair price
determined commonly by custom. The fundamental theory of
modern economy,that every man should be free to follow
his own pecuniary interests as he thinks fit,without fraud,
does not distinctly emerge until the 16th centuty in which
Shakespeare deplores the decline of the loyalty of the
antique world "when service sweat for duty,not for mead".
"I" T.E.Cliffe Leslie's Hist.& Future of Int.and Profit.
"2" C.A.Collin.
(6)
Never-the-less while this was the prevailing sentiment
of the current business morality yet the competitive prince-
ple was constantly struggling to assert itself inspite of
morals and legislation.
Thus we have seen that freedom of contract was firt
limited by status-then by statutes in opposition to the
competitive principle. Such were the changes of public
policy in England as to the theory of freedom of contract.
In this age and especially in this countrywhere the
will of the people shapes the law,public policy is a more
potent factor than ever in deciding what the relations of
one person shall be to another as to the making and enforc-
ing of contracts. But in the United States,the fact that
we have a Constitution which is the supreme law of the land,
must not be overlooked; and except as public policy vents
itself in amendments to that Constitution it must remain
unchanged and upheld.
For the most part the Constitution is explicit enough
to guard against unconstitutional legislation,but there
is one particular grant of powers vested in both state
and national legislature in which public policy can most
easily exceed its right . I'refer to the "police power"
which ha§ been defined as-------
(7)
In its broadest acceptation,as the general power of a
government to preserve and promote the public welfare even
at the expense of private rights ".
The whole scope of legislation restricting freedom of
contract must be within the exercise of this prerogative ,
otherwise it is unconstitutional and void. Therefore we
must conclude that ,while public policy regulates the legis-
lation in question,it only decides how far thw police power
shall be exercised . It may contract or enlarge the exercise
of its jurisdiction as the people see that the exigencies
of the time require.
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.
Before we shall turn t& the exigencies of the present
time and discuss the Constitutionality of the remedies
that have been applied,it seems not out of place to consider
the present condition of that theory which so.closely
concerns ras- "The Freedom of Contract".
In this elaborate and highly developed system of
government,we have been compelled to recognize the fact that
true liberty is not licence. So that what was once a moral
law forbidding persons to so exercise their rightd that
they interfered with the rights of' others,has now become
more or less embodied in the positive or civil lawand
properly so,now that we have a more correct idea of liberty.
And the topic now is practically to show the extent that
public policy has limited the former liberty of citizens
by this restrictive legislation.
Although it is urged by some that with few exception.
we now have freedom of contractthe facts of the case ought
to leave the potlt incontrovertible .The legislative and
judicial history of this country is repletb-,with instances
in which statutes impairing the freedom of contract have
been held valid and enforced against individuals as well as
y
corporations. Some of the principle ones that have been sus-
tained and enforsed are the following: Fixing a maximum
rate of interest on money loaned; Fixing the maximum rates
for grain elevators and railroads; Fixing maximumiprice for
official reports of decisions Fixing -the price of bread
Regulating insurance contractsand preventing forfeitures
for non-payment of premiums; Conferring the right of redemp-
tiom after sale for breach of condition in a mortgagecontra-
ry to its terms; Forbidding the retaking of propwrty sold
conditionally for non-payment of an installment,without a
tender of the sum paid on the property,after deducting a
(9)
reasonable amount for the use of the property or damage to
it ; Forbidding contracts for the attorney's fee on the
opposite party ; Forbidding gambling comtracts,and contract
between husband and wife ; and statutes regulating the sale
of liquors,of oleofargarine and of patent rights.
(10)
In the absende of legislative enactments,the courts have
the power to hold contracts upon many subjects to be void
and unenforceableas opposed to public policy : such as
contracts riot to resort to the courtsbut to submit to
arbitration; Contracts not to remove a cause from a State
Court to a Federal court : Contracts in restraint of trade;
Contracts waiving the benifit of stay of execution laws; and
contracts exempting a person or corporation from liability
for the negligence of his or its servants.
In these cases the courts have power to decide what
is public policy only because the legislature has not indi-
cated its will to the contrary. But as seon as the legis-
lature decides the questionits act is binding upon the
courts.
With these and other similar statutes,it is perfectly
ev&dent to the most casual *bserver that freedom of contract
from a legal point of view at least does not exist.
And moreover it would be a fiction to suppose that it
existed even if every statute on the books shauld be annulled,
for from a sociological point of view it will be seen upon
close study that this theory is illusory and does not exist
in practice. Every one knows that there is some measure of
truth in this.:lt.is axiomatic that dependence and not
(II)
independence is the order of things-and a most disorderly
order-with no regularity and no certainty. For one person
is financially dependent upon another who is in turn
physically dependent upon him: intellectual and financial
men are also interdependent ; ability in one profession
is exchanged for ability in another- and what aggravates the
whole social problem is that there are all these qualities
and powers bound up in somewhile in others we find barely
a trace of any: and again there are all degrees between the
two extremes.
And when the social order has thus been examinedno one
of intelligence will attempt to controvert the assertion
that however true the Declaration of Independence was in
asserting that" all men are created equal"-it is equally
true that all men are not living equal. And with such
inequality how can there be freedom of contract ? Not nomin-
ally so,but in reality.
Freedomso far as it existsis the right to do as one
pleases with himself or his property. Freedom of contract
is the right to limit that right. So that where 'two parties
do not meet on equal terms,free contract may be and often
is the surest means ef destroying freedom. And there are
instances of great number in which free contract now means
less freedom forever after.
(12)
Self-enslavement was an extreme case and belongs to the
past but there are instances involving the same principles
today; some of which savor very much of self-enslavement
itself.
In spite of the many regulations of contract-making
that are some-what pretective to the laboring classes,yet
the laboring man is under a decided disadvantage when making
contracts. He makes them- why ? Becauseto sustain lifehe
is obliged to . The ordinary man of better circumstances
must make them as welland the highly developed corperatiun
is not exempt from the"must";but while the two latter make
them to sustain life also,they are further from starvation ;
they can,having more resources,wait longer when driving a
bargain,can force their weaker bretheren to concede every-
thing and need not themselves colcede anything. The result
of the numberless strikes throughout our history-their
almost universal failure- forces us to this conclusionif
nothing else does.
It is the corporation and individual with equal capital
who are considered respectible-never the laborer. It is
the corporation that is born of and supported by the govern-
ment-petted by courts (though damned by juries' and
(13)
and empowered by the "almighty dollar". The corporation
has every thing --the starving wage-earner,nothing. Economist5
have always been aware of the capitalist's advantage yet
they have contitually protested against any legislation to
equalize,in any degree,the power of men in their contractual
relations;and so strongly has it been protested in this
country,that upon our Corstitutionso full of true freedom
in every other respecthas been grafted the doctrine of
"laisser faire". The untruthfulness of this doctrine as a
universal poposition has long been established, but we
have not escaped its influence. The "Manchester School"
has strenuously upheld it and the free traders,like it
in other respectslikewise been consistently but fallacious-
ly upholding itso that- ttiLhas! b e en kceptedintpracti6e T-l
at least,not alone by the political party of free traders
but even by those who claim to be its strongest opponents.
The reasons for it have been manifold,but the chiefest of
which is its practicability and seeming justification.
Its fallacy in the assumption of the economical and
social efficiency of competition lies in the failure to
distinguish between services and commodities-between man
and merchandize. Man is looked upon as under the same
complete subjection to the impulses of pecuniary interest as
a bale of cotton is in the hands of a trader. With respect
(14)
to merchandize-destitute of sympathies or antipathies-
competition is,when modified,so far perfect as to be a fair
controlling power. But with man,especially the laboring man,
bound by manifold strong attachments to placebo home and
friends;without mobility,by will or ability; and the employ-
er -generous as the world goes buzt controlled by his own
selfish interests-then it is self-evident that competition-
supply and.demand-"the iron-clad law of wages"-is not a
sufficiently adequate or just controller of labor as it
seems to be with other commodities. But, denying that labor
is a commodity at all-denying that man was meant to be a
machine, to be kept in the market subject alone to the
supply and demand,-denying it does not change the state of
affairs however as a fact.-labor is treated as a commodity
and mansa machine. As such,how can a man make contracts
freely and to his own tasteWith so few hands to work with
and so many mouths to feed -he must do whatever he can find
to do within the limited field to which he has access while
a commodity has the whole world for its range. If his
limited field is glutted with men he must work for what
any poverty-stricken single man will work for,or the single
man will get the position. If the times are hard,he must
endure reduced wages,for he cannot leave in search of employ-
ment.Yet he must pay the landlord whatever rent he demands.
The laboring man is thus pinched on both sides -and yet,
sometime- when this strange corcnodity becomes too cheap and
the house rent of the employer becomes too dear,we find
such an awakening of life as no other conuodity ever has,
and the sympathies and antipathies of the laboring man are
vented in such Utivities as the late "Pullman Strike".
The strike has seldom been successful-yet when we consider
that they are steadily increasing in number ind magnitude,
we may be sure that no such movemnets are without great
initiatory force and some element of reason and deterrhination.
To be sure,the question of "capital and labor"is here
the direct issue;yet the -trouble starts from the inequality
of the men in making their contracts and the injustice that
arises therefrom in the so-called "freedom of contract".
Then it is true that I have considered the laboring man in
particular as so unjustly treated from the unequal standing,
in his direct dealing with one of more power. Yet the same
is true as between even'the latter and one still str nger-
indeed it very often compels the previous state of affairs;
and so on thrnugh all the stages of ability and resource.
(In)
The order of dependence is most wonderfully developed,indeed
it is developed in a manner not to be tolerated long by th
those most injured,nor fostered much longer by those
patriotic and humane citizens who see the injustice ,when-
ever they see a way to remedy it. The American are already
awake to the problem,and contirnuous,persistent effort will
solve it " Laisser faire",in my jUtdgment will never accom-
plish it Legislation is a possible remedy. Still the
efficiency of legislation depends upon the general public
opinion,and any visionary schemes of legislation would not
be tolerated -at least for any length of time.
THE POLICE POWER.
The people of the American colonies by -the establish-
ment of their independence held unto themselves all sovereign
power. As individuals -they provided for a form of' general
gevernment by adopting the Constitution of the United States
and thereby marked out a somewhat definite and stable path
which they would follow , They reserved unto themselves the
supreme authority through the Constitution and the Congress,
yet delegating some concurrent tut subordinate powers to
(1'7)
the several States as sovereign bodies.
But it was not the design of the Constitutional Con-
vention to hamper all the future Americans with the letter
of the Constitution. It wished to perpetuate its spirit,
!Liberty".So that I see in the Amendment and general welfare
clauses, provisions purposely and deliberately constructed
with this end in view.In these clauses did the wise founders
of the Union provide for the progression that was hoped to
follow; It put into the hands of the people great
powerso great that many have hesitated and questioned
whether these clauses really show the intent of the
Constitutional delegates. Yet that police power,great as
it may seem to be ,is held down to true republican principles
laid down in the Constitution that are irrevokable,and so
interpreted in this case as to confine its exercise to
promoting the healthpeace and good order of the Nation.
And while public policy is so restricted by the limits
of this police power,the constitution has no control over its
exercise within those limits. Congress may be as changeable
and arbitrary in obedience to the will of the people as it
is pleased, and without conflict with the Constitution if
rightfully exercising its police power.
(18)
And the same is true of the State legislatures so far as
they have been vested with police power. For the U.S.Cons.
has thus allied for the elasticity of public opinion,leaving
it only for the courts -to say whether or not the legis-
lation is constitutionalso that the legislature uses its
own discretion as to its expediency.
With this investigation of powers,we must conclude that
changes of public policy if exercised within the police ,
regulations,fickle as they may be,are entirely constitutional
CHANGE IN SOCIAL, CONDITIONS.
It is quite pertinent also to ask-of what need has the
public policy to change-espesially in regard to the regula-
tion of contract-making. Men are the same today in their
nature as a hundred years ago. Granted--but are the surround-
ings the same now as then ? Does the economical and indus-
trial condition of the country demand of each mar, to act
the same as then ? Is he even permitted to act the same-
and live ?
If the country was the same size now as a century ago
when the Constitution was draftedor even the same as to
(19)
condition,the legislature would never be called upon t6
make laws that are necessities now. But the country has
grown from three million of people mostly on the farm or
in small villages to eighty million of people,the great
proportion of which are now congregated in cities ; the
country is now under industrial conditilis and influences
in the preponderance,whereas it was then mostly agri-
cultural;and that thereby the order of dependence has
intensely increased. These facts account for legislation,now
a necessity,that wo dd have been anomalous in the past.
The problems of today are the result of the change; and
are in proportion to the innensity of the great industrial
departments out of which'they have arisen. The mechanical
inventions together with the developement of the joint-stock
principle has made possible a former impossibility and
produced the prodigious manufacturing and trading interests.
Individual production of the great portion of the commodi-
ties has given way to the large manufactures where the divi-
sion of labor and machinary gives a difcided advantage.
And the laboring man no longer works under his own direction
but as an epployee.inder the supervision and direction of
another. The order of dependence is here intensified.
In fact the present century has witnessed
(20)
a rapid concentration of the industrial power into the hands
of a few.And where the power has been concentrated,respon-
sibility has been lessened-- the stronger shifting it upon
the ones dependent upon him.
And this is most apparently truie in regard to corpora-
tions. The two essential principles which they involve,of
a limited liability and a power in each member freely 'to
transfer his holdings to any stranger,an essential to the
end for which they were established. So that,supported as
they are in these respects by the government,a man of usual
responsibility or without the franchises held by the cor-
poration,cannot have the freedom of contract such as one
might have had fifty or one hundred years ago. He is either
precluded from making any contracts at all with corporations
or he must contract on such terms as he can get from the
corporation. And the majority of wage-earners,who,without
capitalare forced to work for corporations-as all kinds
of' business are rapidly assuming the form of corporate
organization--are still less able to cope with the corpor-
ation in making contracts,and are thus "holding their
right to labor and their right to live,as tenants at will"of
the corporations.
Before the days of corporations and large manufacturing
(21)
interestswhen men were more upon an equality-when at least
all bore the same responsibility,it is possible that the
doctrine of "laisser faire" as applied to labor seemed more
plausible. It certainly did not work the same injustice ther
for each man was more able to look out for himselfdealing
with men more directly,and the competition was not so great.
But now when competition for labor is so graat and when
the laboring man deals not with Ii,. individual men always
but with that inanimate body the corporation,the doctrine of
laisser faire does not work justice-indeed it works a decid-
ed injustice,and any such proposition has no legitimate
place among the principles of American liberty.
CONCLUJION
Over and above the fact that the majority of people believe
that the fewer laws the betterthere is a more or less
distinct conviction throughout the country that legislation
is the cure for all social evils,and one phase of this idea,
that inas-much-as legislation has to a great extent made
some of these evils possible through granting monopolous
franchises and patents to great manufacturing interests and
by protectiW these infant industries with high tariffs-that
new ,legislation should be the remedy for these unfortunate
(22)
social conditions that have been their natural outgrowth.
One of the most stiking examples is the demand for restti-
ctive immigration and contract labor laws . The American
workman cannot compete with the pauper labor of Europe and
live in the comfort he now does-and the public has appreci-
ated the truth of thisand legislation has followed such as
would have excited the whole commonwealth to opposition a
century ago-arid been considered as unnecessary and un-Ameri-
can.
But, the policy of the country has changed to a still greater
extent and in some cases demanded legislation which is by
no means so apparently just or neede-legislation,as I have
said,to remedy social evils,a great portion of which is
really necessary for the welfare of the nation; and some or
perhaps all having this as an end-may not accomplish the
purpose of its projestors,or be of such a nature as to be
unconstitutional. In later chapters the constitutionality
of the most recent of these laws will be discussed at some
length.
Howeverthe changes which have occurred in-.public policy
this legislation seems to turn especially upon one proposi -
tion,viz. The relation of the fundamental rights of the
individual andthe police power of the State. The cause for
the change being that competition no longer works justice;
and the result has been, that while the fundamental rights
of life,,liberty and property are not to be assailled
without"due prosess of law" ,the general trend of public
opinion now is to restrain the use of property by the abridg-
ment of the right of contract in the same manner and for the
same purpose that other personal rights have been defined.
The same motive that actuated the restriction of personal
liberty is now the force that upholds the restriction of
the use of property,which is,viz, to prevent the exercise
of the right of ownership by the few in such a manner as to
interfere with the rights of society as a whole. So that
now the "public policy" is that all business interests
which are"affected with a public interest" are amenable
to legislation.
As to what business employments are "affected with a
public"interest" remains to be determined hereafter.

(25)
A GNERAL VIEW OF ThI5 TE(IsLATION.
Not-with-standing the fact that there has long been
sor: e restriction upon indivtal freedom of contract and the
right of the legislature to pass laws of that nature under
the polioe power has been well establishedyet the Constitil-
tion is invariably invoked whenever a new law is passed )nd
the right to absolute freedom of contract is again declared
to be guaranteed every Individual in the Constitutional
provisions that "no man shall be deprived of lifeliberty or
property without due process of law" and reiterated in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.Constitution which further
provides that " no State shall niake or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or iamiviities of citizens of
the United States:nor shall any State deprive any person of
life,liberty or property without due process of law,nor
deny to any person within its juri.siction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."
The effectiveness of the constitutional guarantees to
individual rights against the police power of the State was
first bruoght into general discussion by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Illinois and the TI.S.Sup.Ct. in 187
in what are comnonly called the Gr-anger Cases. In these cases
It was decided that it was lawful for the Statein the
(26)
exerose of itm polioe powerto regulate the conduct and fix
the maximum charge of compensation in such classes of busi-
nees as were "affeoted with V,'3- public interest" and that
the business of storing grain in bulk in warehouses,as well
as that of common carriers was so affected with public
Interest It has since been establishedthat to the same
extent the legislature can control the right to contract in
reference to property" clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect
the commminty at large". It is argued that-by devoting his
property to a use in which the public has an interestthe
ownerin effectgrants to the public an interest in that use
and subjects himself to the control of the legislatugr for
the comion goodto the .extent of the interest he has thus
created, on this principle the legislature regulates the
business of millers bakeirshackmen fevries ,wharfingers,
Innkeepers and the like.
Wherefore,many of our best legislators and judges are led
to believe that manufacturing and mining concernscorpoate,
or Individualwhioh funnish neoessaries of life as food,
clothingshelter or fuel to hundreds or thousands of the
public:or which employ a large number of the public,as work-
ing-men--anM are protected and defended by the publio at
th public eexpnsear- particularly those which receive the
(27)
benifits of the fostering care of the public under a qysteTn
of prottetion_.these aloo,it is argued,are affected 
with
a public interest and therefore subject to public control,"I"
under the police power of the States. And the most 
recent
legislation of this general naturge is based upon this under-
standing of the scpoe of the police power *and have as their
espeOIal purpose the establishment of amicable and just
relations between the euPleyer and the employee. And there
is a very gradual tendencyto distinguish between the employes
labor and the other commoditiosand to base labor laws on
somewhat the same grmmds as the usury laws are. 11"
These proceed ,says Mr',Jstice Schofield in Frorer v.Pea.
(I-t I1. 1,1 ) upon the theory that the lender end borrower
of money do not occupy towavds each other the qame relations
of equality that parties do InI contraoting with each other
in regard to the loan or sale of other kinds of property,
and that the borrowers necesitSes deprive him of freedom
in oontracting,and place hm at the mercy of the lender".
The position of the laborer is analogous to that of the
borroweras I have shown in a previous chapter and my con-
tention ithat the laborer should have the same proteot ioa.
U1"1 Mum v.Il.94 ijS. Ii3;Pelk v.Chi6& NW.Ry.94 .S.164
Budd v.N.Y.I45 11.S.5SV ; Peo.vBudd 117 N.Y.I; Mun.v.Peo.
6qj,80 ; Mobille v.YUille 3 AlaI.37W Judge Holmes In Comm. v, Perry-155 Mass. i7
(218)
ANrI-TRUK LAWS
The Truok System for the payment of wages otherwise
than in lawf'ul money or otherwise than to the full NaPmnt
earned by the employee has been one of the most productive
sources of social disorder and oppression in the oivilized
world. It has enabled the unscrupulous employer to mulot his
workmen of a part of their earnings in a manner *Jux of ease
and seeming honesty that has for many years escaped the
charaoterization of fraud and the remedies applied to fraud-
ulent dealing*and until recently such have been the past
doctrines of political economy as applied to the COnstitu-
tions of our States and nation,that any legislation in
prohibition of the system has been declared unconstitutional
and void as extra-legislative interference with the right
of every individual to freedom of contract.
Whatever the prevailing judicial opinion as to the con-
stitutionality may or nay not be at the present-it Is cer-
tain that the viciousness of this system has been recognized,
In Englandas far back as 1837,when the "Truck Ant.pf- Is:-2
.1Vch.37,was passed consolidating all previous acts on
S*tutes of Edw.-IVc.I ; 8 EIz.c.7; 14 El1z~o.12; I Anne ch,
187 ; 9 Anne e,20; 20 Anne c.I6: I Geo. c.1; 12 Goo.-I c.X4
13 Geo.Io.,23; i5 Geo4.c. 8; 22 GeO.2 c..29; 21 Geo.2 c.13
S.0 Go.2 c.I2; I Geo.8 c,56: 19 Geo. c..49; 57 ro. coc.
115-122 :58 Goo 5 a.-5 ,
(29)
the subjectthe desirability of altogether doing away with
the system was appreciated. This act prohibited the ranu-
facturers of corn and certain other thtngs,and miners of
coal ,salt etc. from paying the wagus of their laborers in
anything other than the lawfial money of the realm.And the
application of this act has been extended by 50 & 51 Vict.
ch.46 and various other acts'
Buat the first Instance in which a legislature in the Unit
ed States presumed to make any such advance in the restric-
tion of contractmaking is found in the Act of 1881 c.273 of
the Maryland laws, This act provided " that every corproa-
tion engaged in mining or manufacturingor operating a rail-
road in Allegany Countyand employing ten hands or more,
shall pay its employes the full amount of their wages In
legal tender money of the United States;and that any contract
by or on behalf of any such corporation for the payment
of the whole or of any part of such wages in any manner
than herein providedshall be and is hereby declared illegal
and void".
In the case of Shaffer v.Union Mining Co.(55 M.74)which
ocoured soon afterwards,the constitutionality of this law
was made the question at Issute:and after oonsiderate atten-
tionthe Court declared it not to be contrary either to the
prinoples of the State or 1,S.Constitution. The ground
(30)
upon which it was held valid was that the power to require
a corporation to pay its employes in a certain ruanner was
necessarily incident to the power which the legislature
possessed to " amend or alter the corporate charter of the
defendant. But this decision,so dependent upon a
special reasondoes not add mch to the jurisprIdence of
this subject-nor must its authority extend beyond cases of
the same material facts.
And it has been considered authority for preciselt such
cases~rot only those arising under the same statute but
those arising under similar statutes. For since the passaFre
of the Maryland Ast not less than thirteen other states havt.
passed enactments of this natureand,where they have applied
to corpoi'ations,the courts In their respective states have
held them constitutional on the same gromds.
And some courts have considered them unconstitutional. "2"
"I" Statutes not inv-.lid in Ind.Elliott' sSupp. sec.159,()-I60I:
Act of 1891 c.83 p,108; Act of' 1893 p.20I; Kan, Act of 18F:.7c.17I; Ky. Cons.244; St's of T,(y.sec.,I55O; Act of I895:c..3 :
d.Acts of I880 c.273; kfo.R.S.of 1889 sec.7058: Acts of 1891
p.I,$ !)E. Acts Of I[i<c.2So; N.J.1 .. of 187 p.750;sec3 and
p.13T5 seoI&2; Supp.of 1888 p.771 sec,7: N.YAots of 1889
c.38I; Ohio R.S.of 1886 sec.70IS-I6,; Acts of 1887 p.214 sec.
P1a.Br.Dg.plo 0I sec.7-II and p.2678; Supp.2412; S.C.Stat.
of 1892 soc,208 6; Va.Acts of 1887c.39I; Wash. Act of 1887&8
c.128 :vfVa.*Code of 1887 p.983 sec I-5;Acts of"1891c.'-
"2" nass.Act of I887c.31"9 held riot valid In Com.-Perry
155 Iass. I7 ;Ill.Act of I89I Miay 281,sec.I,-2 same by Frorer
Vs P N.o.T . ReIp.395 ;Pa.Act of 188I Jan 29,ditto by God-
charles v. 'iguian 113r Pa.St.43I .W.Va.Act of 1887 p.981 byState V.Goodwill 33 W.Va.179 :;o.Act of'9IpIS3 by State v.
Looais 22 S.W.Rep. 2-94
In the State of Indianawhere a law of this nature was
passed requiring the owners of mines to pay for the mining
of coal every weeks in lawful money of the U.S. and for-
bidding the exe*Ution of contracts by the employes waiving
their right to payment in iioney,-there xxx another reason
was found for holding this ]ind of legislation constitutional
in hhe case of Hancock v.Yaden.(121 Ind..66) What was the r
held can best be told in the words of the judge himself.
Judg;e Elliott~delivering the opinion of the court,said:
"It cannot be denied without repudiating all authority that
the legislature does possess some power over the right tO
contract;wAn if it does,then there is nothing clearer than
that this power extends far enough to uphold a statute
prdvir ing that payment of wages shall be made in money,
where there is no agreement to the contrary,after the ser-
vices have been rendered" -"We cannot ooneive
of a case in which the assertion of the legislative power
to regulate contracts has a sounder foundation than it has
in this instance. ---- -It is of the deepest nd gravest
importance to the government that it should unyieldingly
maintain the right to protect the money which it m7akes the
standard of value throughout the country. The surrerer
of this right might fmperil the existence of the nation it-
self"* "The provision of the statute to which our decision
Is dirctod *opwrates upon all members of the classes it
(52)
enmwrates.It neither cofers special privileges nor makes
unjust dl scriminttions."
Howevpr In this case also do we find the real principle
involved conspicuously absent and another *special reason"
relied ution. The Justice seeme to have been anxious to
hold the law constitutional and .having found another more
sound and certain basis,has dodged the point in question*
This has been thegeneral tendency of those courts which
favor the extention of these doetrine*. Even in the best
instance we have in support of this legislationthe court
confined the basis of its decision to that which was most
favorable.
The statute under consideration in this case-Peel Splint
Co,vs.State( )was an auiementof a previous act
relating to the payment of lAs,.arx-the alteration being,
expressly int"n'rJ to remove the objection which persuaded
the court in State v,Goodwill(.3 W.VnI79) to declare it
void as being special legislation :and the new provision
covered all "persons,firms and corporations engaged in any
kind of business". FAt it will be noticed that in this
docisionthe fact that the defendant was a corporation
played an Important part. The Court says "We base our
decision ,firstupon the ground that the defendant is a
corpmation in the enjoyment of unusual and extraordinary
privileges which enables it and similar associationm to
surround themselves with a vast retinue of laborers who
rn~d to be protected against all fraudulent or suspicious
devices in the weighing of coal or in the payment of labor;
secondly, the defendant is a licensee,pursuing an avocation
which the state has taken under Its general supervision for
the purpose of securing the safety of employes by ventila-
tion, inspection and governmental report, and the defendant
therefore nmust submit to such regulations as the'sovereign
thinks conducive to public health~public morals or public
security."
It is unfortunate that another matter of constitution-
ality should be included in this case for it detracts from
the real merits of the point in question.
But it will also be noticed that the basis of this decision
is not the same as in the corporation casesof which Shaffer
vs.TJnion M.Co.(supra)is an example.The reason is no longer
that the legislature had power to"alter or amend"the provi-
sions of the corporate charter:but because the corporations
and similar associations had unusual and extraordinary privi-
leges". Judge Luccs says: We do not base this decision so
much upon the ground that the bmttx*imzxx business is
affected by the public use; but upon the still higher ground
that the public tranquility and the good and safety of soc-
iety,demand,where the number of employes is such that
(3 4)
specific contracts with each laborer would be-improbable
if not Impossiblothat in generalcontracts justice shall
prevail as between operator ard miner; and in the companY's
dealing with the multitude of laboreras with which the State
has,by special legislationenabled the owners and operatOMS
to surround themselvesthat all these opportumities for
fraud shall be removed. The state is frequently called upon
to suppress strikes;to discountenance labor consliracios;to
denounce boycotting as injurious to trade and ootmerce;
and It cannot be possible that the same police power may
not be invoked to protect the laborer from being made the vi
victim of the compulsory power of that artificial combina-
tion of capital which special statelegislation has origin-
ated and rendered possible It is a fact worthy of consid-
eration and one of muach historical noteriety that the court
may recognize it judlcially.that every disturbance of the
peace of any magnitude in this state since the Civil war,
has been evolved from the disturbed relations between
powerful corporations and their servants or employes, It
cannot be possible that the state has no police power to the
pr teotio of solety against the recurrence of such dis-
turbanoes which threaten to shake civil order to its very
foundations. Collisions between the capitalist and the
workingmn endanger the safety of the sjatestay the wheels
of comerce and at times throws an Idle population upon the
bosom- of the comunity. Surelt the hands of the legislature
cannot be so restricted as to prohibit thopassage of laws
directly intended to prevent and forestall such collisions".
In reviewing the situation then we have the law partly
settled-definitely so in some cases and in others we have
decisions both ways. In the first placethere is no dispute
as to the strength of Hancock v.Yadon-that these anti-truck
or "store order"laws may be upheld on the basis of protect-
ing the currency of the United States,
Secondly,that the state may make these laws In aenndments
or alterations of corporate charters where they have so
reserved that privilege.
Thirdly -as the Splint case decides -that corporations and
similar associations enjoying extraordinary privileges which
enables them to control a large nunber of laborers-or the
supply of food,clothing eto.,for a large number of people are
affected with a public interest and thus subject to state
regulation.
Fourth ,that while the laws declare individual persons in
the same btsiness also liable to these regulationstheir val.
idity is seriously questioned,
(:56)
FINES LAWS.
Another ant the latest kind of legislation to prevent
employers from defrauding their servants is etbodied in what
are ealled "Fines Acts". Within a few months during the
year of 1891,the legislatures of three states considered it
as constitutional as it was wise to pass these laws:Ohio
being the firstclosely followed by Illinois and Massach-u-
setts.
The Mass.Actknown as the "Weavers Fines Act"was the f
first to be declared unconstitutional as it was so held by
the Supreme C't of that state in the case of Cotuionwealth
v.Perry (26pra) very soon after its passage. The act in
question is as follows 0 No employer shall imi ose a fine
upon or with-hold the wages or any part of the wages of an
employee engaged at weaving for Imperfections that may. arise
during the process of weaving".
The same general reasons for declaring all acts which
interfere with the freedom of contract,are used in support
of this decislon:that it Is unconstitutional in that it
interferes with the inalienable right of " acquiringpossess.-
Ing arn protecting propertyguaranteel by the state consti-
tution.by restricting the necessarily incidental right to
make reasonable contracts.
"I" Ohio-Act of Apr.29,I891 : Illinois.. Act of May 28-'91
Mass. -May 28 180I: act of 1890 c.410 .
The court does say that if the act Wwent no further than to
forbid the iMosttion of a fine by an employer for imperfect
work At might be sustained as within the l0gislative power
confered by the constitution of this Coimonwealth in chap.
I sea.I art.4,whtch authorizes the general "to uake
ordain andestablish
all manner of wholesome orders,lawssta*-
utes and ordinances -directions and instructions either with
penalties or wlthoutiso as the same be.not repugnant or
contrary to this oonstitutionas they shall judge to be fow
the good and welfare of this oommonwealtht nd for the gov-
ernent and ordering thereofjand of the subjects of the same?
It might well be held that If the legislature should deter-
mine it to be for the best interests of the people*#that a
certain class of employes should not be permitted to subject
themselves to an arbitrary imposition of a fine or penalty
by theft employerit might pass a law to that effect",
But here the court makes a distinction It foresees the
possibility of imperfeetion arising from two dIfferent s
sources-from the negligence -and from the want of skill of
the weaver,, But it also sees that the fines may be imposed
arbitrarily as well as for these imperfections;andlt allows
that the legislature might pass laws to prevent such im-
positions-If it could. But the court says "when an
attempt is made to compel paymuent tunder a contract for
good work where only inferior work is done,a different quest-
ion is presented-- If the statute is held to permit a
manufacture to hire weavers and agree to pay them a certain
price per yard for weving cloth with proper skill and cars,
it renders Ma the contract of no effect when it requires
him ,under apenalty to pay the contract price if the employee
does his work negligently and fails to perform his contract.
For it is an essential element of such a contract that full
payment is to be made only when the contract Is performed.
If it be held to forbid the making of such contracts and to
permit the hiring of weavers only upon terms that prompt
Tpyment shall be made of the price for good workhowever
badly their work may be done and that the reTmdy of the
employer for their derelictions shall be only by suits
against them for damages #it is interference with the right
to make reasonable and proper coxntraots in conduoting a
legitimate business which the-Constitution guarantees to
every one when it declares that he has a natural,inalienable
right of'acquiringpossessing property".
The lengb), with which I have quoted from this decision
is not because of any particular rmerit in the case but beo
because it is the only case of direct judicial authority In
which an opinion has been written .See notE "I" on next page
(39)
Wt however valuable Justice Knowlton's opinlon may be of
itself-the authorities in support of it are noticeably weak,
for nearly all have been over-ruled ;or the statutes *hiich
they declared invalid ,so remedied as to be now considered
perfectly constitutional,
It was also declared that this law impaird the obligation of
contractsbut Judge Holmes conclusively points out in his
dissenting opinion that this Is a very weak position as it a
could ii no way apply to contracts made after the act in
question and he further declares that In his opinion this
legislation did not interfere with the right of acquiring
possessing and protocting property any more than the laws
against usury or gaming ,and these are indisputably within
the police power. TBit he had still stronger reasons
for dissenting o. f'oresaw the object of the legislature
and the legitimacy as well as the justice of' this act.
"I suppose ,he saysthat thls act was passed because the op-
eratives or some of them thought thaft they were often cheat-
ed out of a part of their wages under afalse pretence that
the work done by them- was imperfect,and per.uaded the
- -- ----------------------
"I" A similar decision was made on the same day in case of
Commv.Potoaiska Mills Corporation 1 Mss I1/ .noe,
For further discussion of principled involved see: Godoharles
v.WigeMan 133 Pa.St.43I: State v.Goodwill 53 W.Va.179
In re Jacobs 98 N.Y.98 *PeoMarx 99NY.377 Peo.v.Gillson
109 N.Y.339 VMillett vPeo. 117 111.294.
legislature (40)
legislature that their view was true. If their view was
true,I cannot doubt that the legislature had a right to
deprive the employers of an honest tool which the were usin
for a dishonest purpose ,and I cannot pronounce the legis-
lation voidas based upon a false assmwption since I know
nothinr about the matter one way or another."
This view takein by Judge Holtes seetas to be the souder
and more liberal one. To the legislature is confided the
generous power to make such laws as it shall deem f&t for
the general welfare,subject of couse to constitutional
limitations, Surely it may consider the fact that employers
may possibly oppress their employes by arbitrarily with-hold-
ing their wages on any pretext,and that such was a common
occurrence, And an Rct in prevention of it would seem a
wholesome and reasonable law for the good and welfare of
the public.
The act does not pretend to deprive employers of their
remedy for imperfect work by action. They still have this
reiedyand the fact that it r iay be practically worthless
is no ground for declaring +.his act unconstitutional .And
firthermore the high purpose of the legislature which
prevailed in the passage of this act is further vindicated
by the spirit of fairness to the employer in hhe subsequent
(41)
act of 1892,repea3Ang the act of '91 and providing " that
no fines shall be imposed for inflirfections in the work
of the weavers unless the defects have be(..n shown to the
employee and the amount of penalty agreed upon by employer
and eiiployee". 13ut ,hls statute has not yet been tested so
leither have those of Illinois or Ohio,so that this legislat
tion as a whole does not rest upon a very sound basisztherv
being only threeinstances in alland in no case has there
been a judicial opinion expressed declaring their validity
Stll;,even though they are in the border-landthey have not
been considered so Inexcusably vicious or assuredly invalid
bhluthat they have survived for thtree years with out being
contested. In my opinion-so long as they are reasonably
construed and have for theit prime object the prevention of
fraud,they are and ought to be considered as valid express-
ions of the police power.
"I" The Ohio and III. Acts are more general-applying to all
industries. The Ill.st: tutetmuch like the last Mass.aot ,
prohibits fines or deductions for any reason except for
lawful ohecks or drafts advanced without discount and except
such simns as may be agreed upon between employer anrv employe,




It is a singular fact that so many statutes regulating
the time when employers shall pay their employes should have
been passed in the different states -at least fifteen- when
as a class they are so near the border of tunconstitutionali-
ty."2" With the same possible oppositioo anti writh no preten-
tion to the virtue of a preventive of fraudthese acts have
been passed ,and existed almost without any judicial author-
ity:and the authority which they do have ,as expressed i.,
the leading cases ,is based only on the sound principle of'
corporate ohatter amendments"with additional argumients on
the grounds for their existencewhioh some consider as
rightfully applicable not only to corporations but as to
other associations havinw great advantages.
"1" Ark.Act of 1889 c.6I ; Cal. Act of 1891 c.146 P.I95
Conn.St.of 1888 c.106 sec.I748-52 ;Ind.Act of 1889 p.144
ljurn's R.S..gec.7059 ;Act or 1891 c.83 p.108 ;Kan.Act of 1893
c.I87 p.270 : Me.Acts Of 1887 c.I34.;Nass.Aot of 1886 c.87 ;
Act of 1801 c.239 ; Mo.R.S.of I880) c.42.art.I and ch.II5
art.I ;Act of 1891 p.183 ; N.H.Act of 1887 c.26 ; N.Y.Act of
1890 c.388; Act of 1890 c.388; Act of 1893 c.71? . ; Ohio
Act of 1887 p.214 sec.I as amended 1890 Laws of Ohio Vol.87
p.78; R.S.of Ohio 1890 vol.2 sec.8769 ; Penn.Br.Dig.p.I01O
sec.7-8;Act of 1887 No 121; Br.D1ig.(supp.)2412; same 2P78 ;
R.I. Act of 1891 c.918 ; Tenn.TAws of I89I-ex.sess. ch.5
Va.Act of 1887 c.393 sec 1-2 ; Wis.Act of 1889 C.474.
Wyoning Act oR 1891 a. 82 .
"2a" Braoeville Coal Co.v.Peo.147 Ill. 66
State v.Brown &Sharpe M'fg Co 25 At.Rep. 246
Loop v.St.Louis I.M.&S Ry. Co 25 S.W.J-?ep. 75
(C)
In the case of State v,Brown & Sharp* & Co.(supra) the Sup,
Ctof Rhode Island also avoided the real authority which the
legislature attempted to use-its police power-and decided
the case wholly on the ground that the legislati-re exercised
but its acknowledged power to amend corporate charters.And
the same would probably have been held in the case of T'race-
vill Coal Co.v.Peo.(supra) had not the statute been con-
sidered as special legislation in that it referred only to
certain corporations while it did not affect other corpoe-
ations created under the same generallaws.
And in the latest case of Leap v.St.Louis I.M.& I.Ry.Co.
supra), the law was held constitutional as applying to cor-
porations but not other wise.The statute there in question
required all corporations,companies and persons engaged in
the business of operating or constructing railroads to pay
thpir employes on the day of their discharge all trpaid
wages due themnat the contract price. But the court htId
that the legislatuvw cannot make it unlawful for individuals
to agree with each other that wages shall be paid at any
time after pxymxt the day on which the labor by ,'hich they
are earned shall be completed ,or that the price of property
sold shall be paid on gven day after the sale,since such
a contractlas to the time of performance,is necessarily
harmless,and' of purely private concern", Dut as usual
the judou here grapples with another fallacy and calls it
(44)
truth, He too considers labor a coiwiodity ant fails to dis-
tinuish If from property.
.v YThls legislation is to onable the laborer to have an
irfnmdiate rtiturn for his work-becauzse of his especial need -
and to prevent the employer from with-holding his vages
that he may enjoy their profit a. long as possible . It can-
not be considered pure frauid but dishonesty ,and the legis-
latures ,in that it is so disadvantageous to the wage-earner,
consider it public policy that the laborer be protected.
Neither need the wage-earner feel that he is being made in-
fantile by this protection to his wages. Soine deluded
conservatives have so held, But the fact that this legis-
lation is ofteh sought for and obtained through the labor
organzations,refutes this.
These statutes vary in relation to businesse;s included,
the time for payinent and the means of enforcement Buttheir
general object is to relieve the la orer.Whether in fact
this relief has a constitutional basis remains to be geomr-
mined. But the legislation has been so general_atnd so
generally accepte"i that the probabilities are that it will
be upheld. The fact that it simply precludes the employers
from making illegal or at least dishonest prodits causes him
to object with less earnestdess than he would if some mater-
(45)
kal and valuable right had been invaded,and to some extent
aooounts for the limlted nduiber of cames contesting this
legislation.
( 46 )
LAWS RFTGTJiATIN(, THE HOURS 07 LABOR
Contracts of employment have been regulated in rary states
by statute not alone as to the time and method of paym~ent.
oil"
lu also in respect to the hours of labor. These statt te,
however differential in the details,aivi to dutermilne the
lengthof a regular day's labor; the reasons for which are
two-fold:firstto protect the laborer from oppression of
an± employer who may compel his employes to work as many hours
in it day as they deSire--the same aA the law protects him
from the abuse and oppression in regard to ttme and method
of payment.Or secondl,,to protect the health of the public
and the laborer
--------- -----------------------------------------------------------
"I" Statutes applying to women and children . Ala.Act of
1887 no.149 sec.I * Cal. Pen.Code sec,651; Act of Ir89 c.7
Conn.!St.of I088 c. I0)( sec.I745 ; Ga.Code of 1882 seo.I885
IllAct of 189,, p.99 ; Ind. ,of IR8! c,,5 :4ec,212,5 ;EFlliotsq
Supp.c.2 sec,346-17 ; Act of 1893 c. 78 ; La.Act of 1886
No.43 sec.4 ; le .R.S.oi 188,'1 c.48 secI , Act of I8_:7 c. IM9
sec.I ; Md. Code of rlen.Pub.aws of 1888 art..7 sec,'I,'-40 ,
Mass. ,;t.of 1882 c.74 ; Act of 1884 a, 275 ; Act of 1890
c. I8 ; 892 c.357 p.37tf ; 1894 c. 508 sec . 10-i,- 1 MIch.
Acts of 1885 nq 79 t Act of 1887 c. 152 ; Act of I6W4o.2;5
Minn. ren.St.of 1878 .24 soc.IJ 2 ; Act of 189 c.96
N.H. Act of 1887 0.25 & PuboSt.c 180 sec.14 ; N.Y.Act of
IP 86 suc.6986 : Act of' i890 o.39R : Pa T3r.DIg.p.77I ; Act
of 1889 no.235 R.I .Act of I885 c. 51()
S.D.Pen.Code c.57 sec 7359 ; It RS.of I;0 c.2,2 s-oC.45'"
Va. Act of 188 9-90 c, I91 ; Wis. Ann. St. c.13', p. O2,
(47)
By'far the greater number of laws have their foundation in
the lattr reason and these apply liostly to enployes of
railroad.s and to worvien rind children either because of the
pecaliar incapabilities or the extra-ordinary positions of
these persons
InPeo.v.Phyf(,Justice NMaymard says in ruspect to the
right of the legislature to limit the days labor of railroad
employes,that " In view of the great danger to and even
the destruction of life and property which might result from
the atteiopt of men,whIo have becomie enfeebled by prolonged
and exhausting effortto control enpine- and cars when in
motionit might be claimed that it was within the province of
the legislature to enact such a lww and make the violation
of it a crime ;that it wa., a reasonable exercise of the pol-
ice power of the state: ind was also -a lawful asscrtion of
its reserved right to regulate corporations of this charac-
ter in their relations to the public ". The validity of
such laws is xdoiubtedly acknowled1:ed so long as the pt blic
---------------- ------
'IT" Sta.tutes applying only to railroad eynloyes. Cal.Pol.
Code sec. if46 ; Col. Act oi' 1891 p.284 ; Florida ,Act of
I195 c. 4199 ; Ya. Acts of !893 c. .386 ; Acts of 1S94 c.508
sec.9 ; Mich. ,ct of 1893 p.27(; ; Minrin, Act of IW35 c. 206
sec.l"2 ; Act of 1891 c.17 ; Montana Act of I89.i p.67 ;
1I.J. Act of 1887 c.112 ; N.Y.Act of If-"l c.5,29 ; Act of
1892 0.711 ; Ohio Act of' 1890 c. 10 ; Act of 1892 c.259
Pa. Act of 1887 nq.I0 .
(48)
as the public health is the object of protection.
It is still more obvious that those statutes applying
to women and children :ire legitimate applications of the
;io.lce power-to preserve the pLublic health. Th liaportance
6f having healthfuil wortien an r% children1 is f*,illy appreciated:
anr' it is bpcause of the physicafl inferiority of these
classes that especial protection is glve:,.
In the case of Couwn. v.u.ton V.f' ,. Co (.120 Mass.. Fs8-J)
statuite prohtbitlng the emiPloyment of' all persons ander
the a7e of' eighteen,arid of all women,in labori-ig in any
manuf-inturing establishment iiore than sixty hours a week-
violates no right resemred under the constitution to any
Individual citizen,ari may bh maiiteir eri as a heAlth or
police regulation. It does not forbid any Person firm, or
corporation from employinF) as jiai_. laborers of this class,
as such person5s,fir'm or corporation should desire. But the
legislature has deemed it to some extent dangerous to health
that theqe persons should be couipelled to labor more than
eight - a dtak day or sixty hours a week inall
manufacturing estahlshen ts.
,(eneral statutes , Col. Act of 1:';94 c.( : C(a. Act of Im,9
p.If' : Idaho Act of I91 p. I-,91 ; Kan. Act off I-)I c.1!4
ass. Act of I ,, e, . Ir.7579 '. '1C ; liW7, -:.40€i ,I; i8)
c. 5o8 p. 79 ; 'orj. cod ofG .Pub.law of iirt
Act of1 ),, .2 ,.402 ; Neb. Act of I.c'I. c.54
( 4W)
Not indeed does it violate what is called "hte sacred right
of labor" belonging to each ini:rlvidual iii these classes,and
the exerciso ff" it in ~x kx accordance with their owvn jLudpi
mlent . These laws do not forbiri tteii, workin, Jis loni- a,,
they plense airj in any prrticu,: ir biwije:.-s, It it.*-rely
cont inoously
prohi bits thLc beinfr t irployed lix ti s,.';:ie servict iiorf, that,
. cerhii ur[:ber of i ours per.day or week i-,d this is cer-
tainly i valird provision for the public health.
"The general rul, undoubtedly Is that any elrsoj i:s at
liberty to pursaue any lawful c-llinR ;nd to do so in hi-;
own wa riot encroa hinp" upon the rights of oth ers ". 13t
here -is elsewhere It. is proper to recognlze distt iti,,/l': h
rest in the ntuire, of things . FOhte ploy i:t5 iay afllisa-
1,le for tiules and ii:proper for fevialesand Tegulation.S
exercising the impropriety and forbidding woiuvn CnhRagLL; i.
thela wold erl open to no reasonable o6t-jection . The -ac is
trite of young- children whose :rmployzuwnt In itines and ,t.tnu-
"I "&2
facturies is cora ,only and ought to be regulated
------------------------------------------------------------
continue'iI N.J.Act or l8C c.S 2 ; N.Y. Act of I ! c.
Act of I;4 c.P22 , 'z.C. Act of If2 p.V'- ; Act of ]Y<' c.
Wyo~inF Act of IPI , TJ*.* 27 St. 4O , i~h Act of I394
ch. !I
"I" FStatutes poii rc rr~~ ~icid ocrwIe~ily
unt-tq. Ill.. Ac t. o-' .f : '1 *;7 I 897- . In.Act o i
_4, .- c.78 ; AcP of c.C; Ohio Act o(- -, !I
c.2715 ; Pa. !vt of 3IR9I 1 7~7 ;'T<f; ; 'reri Art of'
Ir9- c.IS ; Wash. Act of 1891 c.g; ; W.Va. A't of' P 'c 19
Jis. Act of Ir )I c. I(4 .
"2" From Ex.Parte -:ubnck ,5 C:-l. 274
(50)
Tht, N.Y.Vev,. Cod c- declares that any person whr, exhlbWt4
a female child under fourteen years of age or who,having '
care of' such a child as parent ,consents to her employment
or exhibition a! . a danc-r or i.;A ,. theatrical exhibition,or
li )r.y exhibition d.,ngero.is or injurious to ihe life ,
health or lorals. o the child ,is o-1ntt y I0 .. isdeeanor.
Andl te case of VJeo.v, * .v(.r (141 ! .V. IR,) deelares this
lau; constltitoi,:dl -slyiig ,that bile it is t enalienable
right of thf- child , evit ei' mat r - a.( ,to pursw, i' trade,
i , t not onry Lu Onf-i th-,t is lawtf 4 _t that 'hieb the
t kt(-? or" soyrei. ".ren .s pAti)e ecOOFnti2?.5 aS proper
arid 82f'u If t'he 5 8 e a'-A thuA4 .forlid wOr, e" ,nd children
fr ,i;:iL , ir- cerft-i% oc Ltpatio at all . It. would seevi
atlr:cI.t (,orf.-in .hnt i, can the hoQ w s er.- of ,vl in
other er;, voyrer-tM ithem I  is 'e necessary for the public
hual th.
T,I- vieei the le, sJ.aturt - makes these re I ation on
any other basis the saite loijt a- to its v.!irdity attsches
as i the (Y.c- of' -inti-truck or -tine. Th'- , 1n x Part.
'. ]Jiack ( prni) tic- courf held Hha ft oin ovdin ,nce of the ci
cIty Of TAs, '.A ele rtir It, t isJ.rl jeqnor " foV r'ny
contractor (o e.paoy ' , ..v pe rso, to .ori< morfe th,-in eight
siolir-z ,i.y or to o,,i,2poy C'hin-,4e labor ,'hre the work is
to 1,e performwr unrie any coltract v-itl the city,ls n;
nitteritptto prevent .ts ) es t, ,
!lawful busiiess and paying th for their service' ,and is
a diredt ifwrilnment of thtt right of such persons to make
nrt enforee their contrnat, -,n iz li-jcT-titltiona mld void
SO fa' *'1 it attempt,; to creot*e , Criinal offensqe. Ruch
ordinance is ILot - valid exercise of the police power ,it
not 'ppearlm. that the services to be perforied w,-re Un-
lawful ov t gvinst pub!ic policy or 1hat. fhe '-Mp3o. yr1n-rt Was
such - Ait h-., inVIft Vor crt,:dri, persons,sii .s females
or infantsor forthdden oi, that grorid B.t this case
does hot precl:zde the ros,4illity of these rerulattiohls. It
a,1lows that, publIto policv may -L-phold s ome -especJ; 1..i in
regard to ,iioloyrfwnts unfit fior 'oii &- ! d childrt:n. The fact
jS that tlhfr'e are ntll~er, s ) , ,oyvm-it' whih are . -!},!inently
danger, us to male laborers ,is those lf. which the labor of
woi-e and children is regtlated . For whiat rewson therefore
should riot laws regi.lati-,F such emiployr eJ t' be considered as
validl,sanitary wi police regulatiors Y.'And whon the labor
of maiiy or 2IlI ti[oymierits become :-o exhaustive arnri injurious
to ptlblic. ieoalth if proloFged -mlay not the legislature here
deem it biecessary tothe public health that hours of - days
or week' s lahor be derfiri(d .
Iii the cas c of' 1r,,: i, ee-s Prirtir, Co.- , Ii , ( ,
tl-ie act coiplainieo of' provide, ,in efftvct, th -t for all
cliss.-s of mechanics,.servants .,r isborers excepting those
engaged
,:nga.ge4 rlJ 'fa 'i , o ' rlo1le:-ti-. .se rv 1.ce , ri-bv:- o:rl .:h , :,
feX(r ; r (e j :hlt, (1(iLC : , ); <i. 1t t fOr "oik ii ,q "'nv '., +r ) jJ ', -2. .,
f..A.A,: *jO -i ~ i ifu';H l. ~t, 2i( ( l sPC10Li ,.'' ,~ ' 1 .. tr, .t, i' l 1 .' ii'.{:.:i~!/) J{t il~l{ V il ' ill- U T," ['ql a~:if{ " t  t}- I n :i l, ,P li - , ... ,,J iq
t,, C;~-'.t v .y fti* n,t , tx oies't-br. the Coll/;4.i tfiltiobl' i ht t(,
Cflt i it ' i (I i'(?1 C(? .v COIfci. t I t .Z. TOP r': '' -CJ J :-
c >,'1i . at i - 'ortie h . orit-' c: s~l)& iC
e.or l -- I:, -. L7w tO -? s IB jrted .y he ".;ithi,
hi-tory of' t,-.: raendft-tio~s axnd the w'eir-ht of ri, hoI i ".
cetainly seeims to hold with it, .- tt ,xceift , th, lm.
atre concl tsivel.y for thie i.W,,ii -,,lvi1 h , tr1 -s '"V j
to woI <eri -:LOr c ildr'en, thvy t-re I;],oi4,e]1y tr-or~i jI jlI,, :l
a, Vr i' -vs i nterfer i*P, w if h . r T ht ti o lrer, ,f cfr. rod
Ili the lt test case ,In re ;:ight n ,Col. U 2 '-(
* iCep. '< )the court there on applicatiwI ] (I clio
in r'ecard to art amnendrment to , Will before the gilslatir(-
which shoillrd apply onl.to " aore- ei :ployen ol'di workin:. irn
rN:ines ,snelters and factories'"- that tJJ --. was clas. iegi S-
latior, an t 'ee.*:fore tmco itut tonal . Howrcrver it, (ie not
U)v, : ( i .the hill n- if. oriiial.y stood -prov dif:v t,.nt,
""i.'i':! 1]. 1o ~r. ,',ttl d nron.o titutc I d y ' -ork for :'j l , -
of :,ClaiM ., i'k i1.b, 'V" and hi tirer. ,i:rloyer isi ;ly on.-
','1ith the last Year the .''.n,.Ct of' .. in He,,.rarreT
77 ' Im-, rieclared tffit the statute fixin- riny' s,
'v:ork "(.:r a,. Inlorer ander contrant wif.? he Citv of Bt3ff' I
af eiht v,W-:; no tlpfcorI.fttiOrI2.lvoi" or' ill riolatirn,
o)T the provisions of sect.ior I of Art,,14 of the 1i*. ,Cov.or
of the, provi 1o1,v o-' -:c 4 l o a 3rt I OT-' ,v ri.. ; -nrl this
cn.me h n. '. i'of: beer. rber,-e' by ft he ,- ;Ll te court.
!ush i the sititatior, of gener,1 l->v's regulatinri the
hou's of labor.
A:- to the .egality of those alit.) yInin to i.oit-n :.TrI chil-
dren-'t~ rail roar. eri,1loyes controllinp, moving iraiis- there is
,,r0 (wle'f-Aoi'n.i e weir-ht of nutf hority decl:-ires thev, to iie
Cot ituttional a A i st, ir pr."ssible th-.! t the octrine, here
applied ; ny extend to the riore r.eral l -ws -'mith more
certaitty then )t present.
"I" .Vl.Tlew of I 9f c.i05 sea.Sioi.
12" :Zapie ,3.s hol ri of the sa.',e stati i,1 P1-'o. * B* eck , N.Y. .
p.47:;.
(54)
LA Vc F01,13 31 1ING (FaMPLOYERS TO R Q'JIRE THAT
THEIR EM'PLOY'( ; SH-AI, NOT MELON(, TO 1ABOR IPNIONF.
The unfriendlly rivalry ol' cApitalist drirl labor union has
hbroutht many of* the former to ri position where they wil not
employ uieinhbers of labor ml-ons . Further they have tried to
covcpel any such who hYp pe to be intheir E!ploy ,to with-
draw fron th( ' UYnion a1 to cmuipel others to agree noti
to ,ioin it ,Thr etvqloyer certainly has a riglt to emjloy
only those whom he wishes ; but has he the right to coerce
his !--en ,by contracts forced upon thetatr, refrain from join-
in anjy society whatever ''.
Many legislatures have passed laws forbidding such con-
tracts ."
Massachusetts has. the following act. "Any person or
cerporatlon,or agent or officer on behalf of suCeh paerson or
corporaton,who shall hereafter coerce or compel any person
or oercons to enter into an ar1 reement,either written or
verbal,not 1-o join or become a member of ai-,ty labor organi-
zation,a z a condition of such person or iderson s securinrg
"I" Cal.Act of I89i o.I,49 ;Ga. Act of I8)P pj.I8,7 ; Ida,Act
of Iq9R p.IS2 : Ind. Act of '  c.76 ; 111. 1891 p.98
M ass.Act of £092 c.21 330 ; mo.Act of 1 P.I22 ; I8 ).I7
14.J.Act of I094 c.21", : Ohi ; Act ol' 692 c,22 .
112" Mass.Act of I .92 C 2 -zO
( F)r )
employlifunt or contidi n,; ii- the. ply',mtrA of n-,y such
person or corrporation,shlall le puri.';he K,.y ,: fi. of Lot
more than on , hufidred diollars ."
WIitiout question this is a limitation on freeom of
contritne. Its legitiimacy is uncertaini ,n there has been no
sound authority givec by the courts
In DTh-vis 1,r. Ftate ( 70 Weekly 1,,xw Tmllehtihi 742 ) the co
court of Coninon Plea.- of i iamilto- Co. ,Ohto ,la of, this
nature ;,as ieclarer constitutioi3a) ; and there i.y be other
cases in the lower courts not reported.
Certainly the laborer ha.; a ripoht to belong to any
organizaticr he may choos2 jvust as the ehpioyer ha.s the same
right - anl each does so it his risk. 13W O fh potit, is-
the State his defmer it. contrary to the welfare of the*
public,thot the employer should take advantage of his great
power over hi laborers and subject them to any agreenment
his whims or his interests should cayuse hitu to lay before
them In-a--mmh a. the legislature ha-, found this op-
pression and sought to rei tedy it along rt asonalIle lines,
hitherto in other cases consAidered valid ,the courts shol'-,
-Lp-hold it.
CONCLUSION
It is urged ,y 1,,r.Tiedrnan ii, his "Police Power" .hat
law ,' hlch are d'sismed to regulate the Oermns of' hirinf7.
in strictly private employments are ,Onconstitutiona] ,
because they operate as an interference vi th one's natUral
liberty,in a case in which there is nt trespass upon private
right and no threatening, injttry to the public" B3ut with
suchlabor disturbances as we have witnessed in the rast feu
years -to quel which R large armjres were necessary and
which rewulted in much bloodshed -J.;. cani be said
£
now vvith any de-ree of truth that there is no threatening
injury to the publicl?
Contii uiiar kX.Tierhya,says :"As soon a,, the law places
one,for aliy just reason ,under a risabllitfvor gives to U;-
other j jrivilege-hiot elnjoyed it. romrno)i by all-pr# otection
from oppression becoles a duty 'of the Stateso far ns the
disability or its cause *or .the grant oi'-privileges produces
or renders. opressiot. possible . lere corporations are
es:ecially referred to,bu.t, the frautds which corporations
mas, y perpetrate are ouite C: likl. to be perpetrated by
anincorporated associations ni i Aividuals a- Well, and
froii these the laborer should b)e rotiectedl as Well.
As a ral..workmen and e:wloyei's should ziaku their on
en11age"
engagements and in particularly, -iold' ifluly agree as to
wages . Never-the-lesq there is a dictate of nature more
imperi',us-that reriunrsoatior. sholild he enough to sapport, ir
reasonafl.e comfortthe lahover and h1-, f'aj4!i.y ,i'or he is
entitled to stich a farvAly. The frauds made against him Ly
the empl~yer deprives "ii. of that remuneration and it is the
duty of the State to protect him.
T he ahsurdity of the- "laisser faire is malde woirder-
fully clear in the recent case of' Godrharles ". -igeman
(II" Pa.St. 4. I ) Mr.Justice Gordon says this Act istjan
infringement alike of the right of' the employer anid the
employe; more than this ,it is an insulting attempt to put
the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only
degrading to his man-hood bu(it subversive of' his rights
af-; a citizen of the T:tited. States. lie ray sell his labor
for what he thinks best,whether o~oney or goodsjust as the
ermployer may sell his iron or coal,and any and every law
that proposes to prevent him from so doln,c is an infringe-
rnent of' his constitutional guaraniee privileges amd conse-
quently vicio~ts arld void ".
But there are thosc iho agree that this is not true and
have,6rn the grounds of public pollcy,protected the opiressed
laboring mian.
--------------------------------------------------
"I" Act to prevent fraud in the weiJ-UngrF of noal , f, riines.
10r. Justice T3rroughs in Ric rdson v. ,]sh 2 Bin?2. -
!)'otests avo),isf r&,.lr tc, strongly tLfoL pulic pA icy.
-i (a r.y
It is au nr',itly hotse hrd when yoti or:ce get az-;trlde it you
will neve1 , knov, whore it will carry yoi.. It I;Aay lean you
front the sowuir la,".
But this country is not ,ir 1y o~ini>n, travellin: the ro
road to despotism -where fi'eedomi of cojrtract is worthless ,
,'nrd Liberty is riot . Thp f",ct i. that ieo!,]. sre 1,i;st he-
Amnnin" t distinguish between property ri,:hts aiA personal
rights correctly ;ind to appreciate that one iuay 1* abridged
as well as the other
Hitherto the judges of this country have been too care-
f'll of th-e .... iprop(-rt, ! rights ord in so doing ,have
sacrificed ,ersonnil. rights . If' they continue to over-ride
the personal rights of our lahor*rs,hy declaring these laws
.uconstituti,,na ],I cain see only ont co nolti5on. There will
follow 1 seriesof con.titutional r/n]endiments that ,'ill make
these retiedies pos.ible;and capital and lrd)or ,"ll the mor,
estranged. Ioweuer If I discern the fultuir. policy of our
lev~i slture;s ani courts with any degree of correctness-there
will be no occ.msion for x such a revoliktion in- th-; la-.,. -for
the whole sale oppression of the lalorer 'rill prohibited.
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